What does Epictetus teach about friendship?

In Discourses, Book 2, Chapter 22, "On Friendship," Epictetus argues that most people misunderstand friendship because they misunderstand where the good lies. If someone locates the good in external things — money, status, a spouse, a career — then whenever those externals come into conflict between two people, the friendship breaks, because each person will protect their own share of the external good at the other's expense. Real friendship, Epictetus says, can only exist between people who place the good in "the will" and in "a right use of the appearances of things" — that is, in their own judgments and choices rather than in outcomes. Where that is true, "there friendship also is possible"; where it is not, friendship is as impossible as trust between thieves splitting stolen goods. He presses the point sharply: a person who has not learned to place their good correctly cannot love, because love requires caring more about the other person's character than about what they can extract from them. Fidelity, modesty, and steady goodwill — the actual substance of friendship — flow from virtue, not from shared interest. The practical upshot is blunt: don't expect loyalty from someone who has never examined what they think the good is, and don't be surprised when relationships built on externals collapse under pressure. Friendship, for Epictetus, is a byproduct of character, not a trade of favors.